Abstract. This paper presents an off-line divisible e-cash scheme where a user can withdraw a divisible coin of monetary value 2 L that he can parceled and spend anonymously and unlinkably. We present the construction of a security tag that allows to protect the anonymity of honest users and to revoke anonymity only in case of cheat for protocols based on a binary tree structure without using a trusted third party. This is the first divisible e-cash scheme that provides both full unlinkability and anonymity without requiring a trusted third party.
Introduction
Electronic cash systems allow users to withdraw electronic coins from a bank, and then to pay a merchant using electronic coins preferably without communicating with the bank or a trusted party during the payment. Finally, the merchant deposits the spent coins to the bank.
Electronic cash provides user anonymity against both the bank and the merchant during a purchase in order to emulate the perceived anonymity of regular cash transaction. It must be impossible to link two spending protocols and a spending protocol to a withdrawal protocol.
As it is easy to duplicate electronic data, an e-cash system must prevent a user from double-spending. Ideally, the anonymity of honest users must be protected and the identity of cheaters must be recovered without using a trusted third party. An electronic payment system must also prevent a merchant from depositing the same coin twice.
To be practical, an e-cash system must be based on efficient protocols. The most critical protocol is the spending phase between the user and the merchant that must be reasonably efficient. It should also be possible to withdraw or spend several coins more efficiently than repeating several times a single withdrawal or spending protocol.
Related Works
The compact E-cash scheme [4] allows to withdraw efficiently a wallet containing 2 L coins and provides all the security properties mentioned above. One solution to improve the efficiency of the spending phase is to manage a wallet that contains coins with several monetary values as it was done in [8] ; the main drawback is that the user must choose during the withdrawal protocol how many coins he wants for each monetary value.
Divisible e-cash schemes allow a user to withdraw a coin of monetary value 2 L and then to spend this coin in several times by dividing the value of the coin. The aim is to allow a user to efficiently spend a coin of monetary value 2 , 0 ≤ ≤ L, (i.e. more efficiently than repeating 2 times a spending protocol). Many off-line divisible e-cash systems have been proposed in the literature [22, 23, 13, 14, 21, 9, 20, 19] providing part of the security properties mentioned above. The first practical divisible e-cash system was proposed by Okamoto [21] and improved by Chan et al. in [9] . Both schemes provide anonymity of users but not unlinkability since it is still possible to link several spends from a single divisible coin.
The first unlinkable divisible e-cash system that fulfills the usual properties of anonymity and unlinkability was proposed in [20] and improved in [19] . The main drawback of these two systems is that they require a trusted third party to get the identity of the user in case of double-spend detection: this is consequently what we can call a fair divisible e-cash system. Moreover, the unlinkability provided by [20, 19] is not strong since the merchant and the bank know which part of the withdrawn divisible coin the user is spending which is an information leak on the user.
None of the divisible e-cash schemes of the state of the art provides simultaneously strong unlinkability and truly anonymity of users.
Our Contribution
We present a strong unlinkable and anonymous divisible off-line e-cash system without trusted third party. We first provide a generic construction and next apply it to the construction of Nakanishi and Sugiyama [20] . Our system is the first that provides the user anonymity such that it is impossible for anybody to make any link between spends and withdraws. Furthermore, our construction does not require a trusted third party to revoke the anonymity of a user that has spent twice the same coin. From a theoretical point of view, the identity of the user can only be revealed when such a case happens. This is the first divisible e-cash system providing this security property.
Organization of the Paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the security model and requirements for a divisible e-cash system. In Section 3, we present the general principle of the construction. Section 4 is the main one: it contains the new divisible e-cash called DCS. Finally, in Section 5, we give the security proofs of our construction.
Security Model
We adopt the model of divisible e-cash system without trusted third party. The three usual players are the user U, the bank B and the merchant M. The security parameter is denoted by k.
Algorithms
-ParamKeyGen(k): a probabilistic algorithm outputting the parameters of the system P arams (P arams contains the parameter k). by any actor that outputs 1 if the proof is correct and 0 otherwise. This verification permits anyone to be sure that the user with public key pk U is guilty of double-spending a coin.
Notions of Security
In the following, it is assumed that the overlying experiment has run the algorithm ParamKeyGen on input k to obtain the parameters P arams.
-Unforgeability. Let A be a p.p.t. Turing Machine. At the start of the game, A is given the public key pk B and P arams. Suppose that A interacts K times with an honest bank during withdrawal protocols, then the probability that the number of valid coins that has been spent is at least 2 L K + 1 is negligible. -Unlinkability. Let A be a p.p.t. Turing Machine. At the start of the game, A is given the key pair (pk B , sk B ) and P arams. At the end, A chooses two honest users 0 and 1. A bit b is secretly and randomly chosen. Then, a spending protocol is played by A with user b (it is assumed that both honest users still have unspent coins). Finally, A outputs a bit b . We require that for every A playing this game, the probability that b = b differs from 1/2 by a fraction that is at most negligible. -Identification of double-spenders. Let A be a p.p.t. Turing Machine. At the start of the game, A is given the public key pk B and P arams. The probability that a Deposit protocol between an honest merchant and an honest bank outputs (⊥ 2 , S, Π, S , Π ) such that the output of Identify algorithm on inputs (S, Π, S , Π ) is not the public key pk U of a corrupted user is negligible. -Exculpability. Let A be a p.p.t. Turing Machine. At the start of the game, A is given the key pair (pk B , sk B ) and P arams. During the game, A interacts with honest users to supply them coins. At the end, A constructs two spent coins (S 1 , Π 1 ) and (S 2 , Π 2 ). The probability that the outputs of the Identify algorithm on inputs (S 1 , Π 1 ) and (S 2 , Π 2 ) is the public key pk U of an honest user together with a valid proof Π G is negligible.
Remark 1.
Notice that the exculpability property implies that the bank cannot create withdrawals for which the user has not participated. We don't need any extra security property, such as the proposal in [28] .
General Description
In an anonymous e-cash system without a trusted third party, spending a single coin consists in generating a valid serial number S to allow doublespending detection and a valid security tag T masking the identity of the spender. The spender has to prove that S and T are well-formed without giving any information about his identity. In particular, the identity of the spender must be recovered only in case of double-spending by using the security tag T . The main motivation of divisible e-cash is to provide a method to withdraw or spend several coins more efficiently than repeating several times a single withdrawal or spending protocol. We provide a general approach to construct divisible e-cash systems strongly unlinkable and truly anonymous (the user identity can be recovered only in case of fraud). This construction can be applied using several basic cryptographic tools.
Truly Anonymous E-cash Scheme based on Binary Trees
The general principle of our construction is derived from the classical binary tree approach [21, 9, 20] with slight modifications. Each divisible coin of monetary value 2 L is assigned to a binary tree of L + 2 levels. The tree root (level 0) with monetary value 2 L is assigned to a serial number denoted by N 0,0 . Any other node has a monetary value corresponding to half of the amount of its parent node, except for the leaves that have no monetary value: they are "dead" leaves. For every level i, 0 ≤ i ≤ L, the 2 i nodes are assigned serial numbers denoted by N i,j with 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 i , except for the "dead" leaves that are not related to any serial number. Any divisible e-cash system should verify the divisibility rule.
Definition 1. When a node N is used, none of descendant and ancestor nodes of N can be used, and no node can be used more than once.
This rule is satisfied if, and only if, over-spending is protected. The general principle of our proposal consists in using a single master serial number from which several serial numbers can be derived. Thus, each node of the tree, which includes the leaves, is also related to a particular value called a tag key. During the spending protocol, the identity of the spender is encrypted with a tag key in such a way that the decryption key can be derived only in case of a double-spending. Using the binary tree approach, each node of the tree is related to a tag key with the following properties.
-The root tag key and the identity of the user are signed (in a blind manner) by the bank during the withdrawal protocol. -From the tag key of a node N , it is possible for everyone to compute the tag keys related to the descendant nodes of N . It consequently exists a public deterministic function F that takes as input a tag key K i,b 0 (where i is the level of the targeted node in the tree and b 0 ∈ {0, 1} depends on the position of K in the tree 3 ), a bit b (0 for left and 1 for right) and possibly some public parameters P arams and that outputs a new tag key K i+1,b .
-From the tag key of a node, it is impossible (without the knowledge of the root tag key) to compute a tag key which is not related to a descendant of the targeted node. -The serial number of a particular node is the concatenation of the two children tag keys. Notation is given in Figure 1 . During the spending protocol, the user computes the tag key of the node he wants to spend. This tag key is used to compute the security tag, i.e. the encryption of the spender identity. This encryption should be verifiable and should include randomness. This randomness should be provided by the merchant to ensure the freshness of the spending, i.e., to prevent merchant from sending twice the same coin to the bank. The user also computes the tag keys related to the two direct descendants of the spent node. The concatenation of these two keys is the serial number of the spent coin. This serial number is transmitted during the spend protocol. Later, the bank will compute all the serial numbers of the leaves of the tree in order to detect a possible double-spending. If a doublespending is detected, then the bank has access to the encryption of the identity (from one spending) and the corresponding decryption key (from the other spending). Then, the bank can easily find the identity of the cheater.
Example 1.
Assume U wants to spend four coins. Then, U selects four unitary coins, e.g. those associated to the node
, and S = LK RK. The random value R used in the encryption scheme is computed using values sent by the merchant. The user must also prove that the coins are signed by the bank and that it will be possible to identify a doublespender. Consequently, the spending protocol consists also in computing a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge Φ that corresponds to the predicates:
-T is well-formed, i.e. E K 1,0 (Id, R) has been computed using:
• the tag key K 1,0 derived using F on inputs the root tag key K 0,0 signed by the bank, • the random R that has been chosen by the merchant, • the identity Id signed by the bank.
-LK and RK are well-formed, i.e., K 2,0 and K 2,1 are both derived from K 1,0 using F. -If LK and RK are well-formed, this implies that the serial number S is also well-formed.
To construct a truly anonymous divisible e-cash system, it is then necessary to provide a function F, a verifiable encryption scheme E and a proof Φ. We give an example in Section 4.
Useful Tools
Proofs of Knowledge. We use zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge constructed over a cyclic group G either of prime order q or of unknown order: proof of equality of two known representations [10, 6] , proofs of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [26, 17] , of a representation, of a double
) [27, 20] , proof of the "or" [11, 25] . We also need a proof of knowledge of one out of two double discrete logarithm
) which is a combination of the two above proofs. These proofs can also be used non interactively by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [16] .
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signature Schemes. These signature schemes are proposed in [5] with in addition some specific protocols:
-an efficient protocol between a user U and a signer S that permits U to obtain from S a signature σ of some commitment C on values (x 1 , . . . , x l ) unknown from S. S computes CLSign(C) and U gets σ = Sign(x 1 , . . . , x l ) that can be verified by Verif(σ, (x 1 , . . . , x l )) = 1. -an efficient proof of knowledge of a signature on committed values,
These constructions are quite close to group signature schemes. This is the case of the two following examples, one based on the ACJT signature scheme [1] , secure under the Flexible RSA assumption [15] , and the other based on the BBS one [2] , secure under the q-SDH assumption [2] .
Divisible E-cash System DCS
We apply the general construction presented in Section 3.1 to the binary tree used in the system described in [20] . The function F is chosen to be the modular exponentiation. For each level i, there are three linked generators g i,0 for "left", g i,1 for "right" and g i,2 to compute the security tag. For a node at level i − 1 represented by the tag key denoted by K i−1,b 0 , the tag key of, e.g. the left children, is K i,0 = g
. For the tag key K i,b and a random value R computing using merchant data, the encryption of the user identity pk U is defined to be pk U g 2 . In the following, we assume that H is a collision-resistant hash function.
Setup
We consider a group G of order o G . The elements h 0 ,h 1 , h 2 are random generators of G.
where o i+1 is the order of G i+1 . For example [20] , it is possible to take G i as a subgroup of Z * o i +1 for the prime o i+1 = 2o i + 1 with all i. As a consequence, the group G i is related to the level i of the tree. The following generators are randomly chosen: g in 2 in G L+1 whose discrete logarithms to the base g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g L+1 are unknown, respectively. All these data compose the public parameters P arams of the system and can be computed by the bank. The bank B computes the key pair (sk B , pk B ) of a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme that will permit it to sign a divisible coin, using the CLSign algorithm.
A user U (resp. a merchant M) can compute its key pair (sk U , pk U ) (resp. (sk M , pk M )) by choosing randomly u ∈ [0, o G [ (resp. m ∈ [0, o G [) and computing g u (resp. g m ). The value u (resp m) is the private key sk U (resp. sk M ) and g u (resp. g m ) is equal to the public key pk U (resp. pk M ).
Withdrawal Protocol
During a withdrawal protocol, U interacts with B. U's inputs are pk B , sk U , pk U and P arams, and B's inputs are pk U , sk B , pk B and P arams.
Verif(σ, (s, u, r))
Fig. 2. Withdrawal protocol
The withdrawal protocol permits U to obtain a new divisible coin by interacting with B as described in Figure 2 . A divisible coin corresponds to a (blind) CL signature done by B on a secret s and the secret key u of U. Both U and B participate to the randomness of the secret s. At the end of the Withdraw protocol, U gets a divisible coin C = (s, u, r, σ = Sign(s, u, r)).
Spending Protocol
When U wants to spend to M a sub-coin of value 2 ( = L − i) from his divisible coin C, he chooses an unspent node of the level i, e.g. the node N i,j . A spending protocol of the node N i,j consists in the following.
1. M sends to U a random value rand and U computes R = H(pk M rand).
3. U executes the algorithm presented in Figure 3 (in pseudo-code) for the node N i,j , outputting the values 4 ( V 0 , . . . , V i , V ), using the path from the root tree to the node N i,j . Next, U computes the security a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. This proof is as follows: s, u, r,r, α 1 , . . . , α i+1 , 
Deposit Protocol
When M wants to deposit a coin (S, Π) to B, M just sends the coin (S, Π) to B. The proof Π should include the monetary value 2 of the divisible coin, the security tag T , the proof of knowledge Φ and the random data R provided by the merchant. B checks the validity of Φ and the consistency with S. If (S, Π) is not a valid coin, B rejects the deposit. Else, B computes, from S, 2 serial numbers S k 1 , . . . S k 2 corresponding to the 2 +1 dead leaves of the sub-tree. This is done by applying several modular exponentiation functions to S, using the right generators. B has to deal with 2 unitary coins (
For every unitary coin ( S k j , S, Π), B checks if there is already an entry ( S k j , S , Π ) in the database. If there is no entry in the database for the serial number S k j , then B accepts the deposit of the coin ( S k j , S, Π), credits the pk M 's account and add ( S k j , S, Π) to the database of spent coins. Else, there is an entry ( S k j , S , Π ) in the database. Then, B checks the freshness of merchant randomness R in Π compared to Π . If it not fresh, M is a cheat and B refused the deposit. If R is fresh, B accepts the deposit of the coin ( S k j , S, Π), credits the pk M 's account and add ( S k j , S, Π, S , Π , ) to the list of double-spenders. For every entry of the database of double-spenders, B will executes the Identify algorithm.
Identify
Assume that a double detection has been done. Then B knows two accepted spending ( 
an ancestor of S 2 or S 1 = S 2 . If S 1 = S 2 then the bank can directly get the public key pk U by computing T
= pk U . If S 1 is an ancestor of S 2 , then the bank computes the masking value g
) from the knowledge of LK 1 and RK 1 and the path 5 from N
as described in Figure 4 . Then, B computes the public key
Verify Guilt
The algorithm VerifyGuilt can be executed by any actor from the parameters of the system Params and a proof Π G . One can parse the proof
2 ) and next run Identify on these values. If the algorithm Identify returns a public key pk U , then one can check if Π 1 is consistent with (2 1 , S 1 , R 1 , T 1 ) and if Π 2 is consistent with (2 2 , S 2 , R 2 , T 2 ). If both are consistent then accept, else reject.
Security Arguments
In this section, we provide the Theorem that stipulates that the DCS scheme is a secure divisible e-cash system. Proof. We have to show that DCS verifies all security properties.
Unforgeability. We want to show that if an adversary A is able to break the unforgeability of our construction, then it is possible to break the unforgeability of the CL signature scheme under adaptive chosen message attack.
We can interact with A during the withdrawal protocol by playing the role of an honest bank with access to the signature oracle. After each successful spending executed by A, we extract, using standard technique, the values (u, s, r, σ) satisfying the relation embedded into the valid proof of knowledge Π. Since there are more spent coins than A can legitimely own, and since there is no detection of double-spending (by assumption), then it is necessary that, among all extracted values (u j , s j , r j , σ j ), one signature σ on a message m = (s, u, r) is unknown and does not come from the signature oracle. Thus, this one more signature is a signature (forgery) in the CL's scheme on the message m = (u, s, r).
As the CL signature scheme is proven secure against adaptive chosen message attacks under the Flexible RSA assumption (if the scheme relies on the ACJT scheme) or the q-SDH (if the scheme relies on the BBS scheme), it follows that A cannot succeed with non negligible probability. Because our proof requires rewinding to extract s and r from an adversary A, our proof is valid only against sequential attacks. Indeed, in a concurrent setting where the attacker is allowed to interact with the bank in an arbitrarily interleaving manner, our machine may be forced to rewind an exponential number of times. This drawback can be overcome by using for instance well-know techniques [12] which would require from the user to encrypt s and r in a verifiable manner [7] .
Unlinkability. We want to show that if an adversary A is able to break the unlinkability of our construction, then it is possible to break an instance of the Diffie-Hellman problem. In fact, we use a variant of the Diffie-Hellman problem, called Matching Multi Diffie-Hellman (MMDH) problem, and we prove in Appendix A that if someone is able to solve the MMDH problem, then it is possible to solve a given instance of the DDH problem.
We can interact with A during the withdraw protocol by playing the role of an honest user except for the two first interactions where we use the MMDH instance. During spending protocols, we can interact with A by playing the role on an honest user, except when the divisible coin corresponds to one of the two divisible coins associated with the MMDH instance to be solved.
We can win the game when A chooses the two first users (corresponding to the MMDH instance) and thus use the MMDH instance during the execution of the final spend. If A does not choose users i 0 and i 1 for the challenge we need to play again the game.
We denote by q U the average number of users created by A. Our success probability is = 1
Remark 2. In the simulation, we use the instance of the MMDH problem to interact with A. We also need to choose a value for the bit b. If our choice of b is correct, then there is no problem and we will be able to conclude with the advantage of A. If this choice is uncorrect, A has a probability exactly equal to 1/2 as ours. Repeating the game many times, our success probability of solving the MMDH instance is greater than 1/2.
Identification of Double-spenders. We want to show that if an adversary A is able to break the identification of double-spenders property, then it is possible to break the unforgeability of the CL signature scheme.
We have access to a signature oracle taking as input a commitment and outputting a signature on committed values. We interact with A during withdrawal protocols by playing the role of an honest bank. We also interact with A during spending protocols playing the role of the merchant. Note that there is no honest users in the game. After each successful spending executed by A, we extract the values (u, s, r, σ) satisfying the relation embedded into the valid proof of knowledge Π. When there is a double-spending, i.e. (⊥ 1 , S 1 , Π 1 ), (S 2 , Π 2 ), that means that there exist a valid serial numberS which can be computed from both S 1 and S 2 . Furthermore, the proof Π 1 is consistent with S 1 and the proof Π 2 is consistent with S 2 and R 1 = R 2 where R 1 is the random chosen by the merchant in Π 1 and R 2 is the random chosen by the merchant in Π 2 . Both Π 1 and Π 2 contains a proof of knowledge of a signature of the bank on the master serial number seed s used to generate S 1 , S 2 andS. Thus, these two signatures σ 1 and σ 2 are such that at least one of the two is different from the signatures obtained during the execution of the Withdrawal protocols submitted to the signature oracle. This signature (σ 1 or σ 2 ) is thus a forgery on CL signature scheme. As the CL signature scheme is proven secure against adaptive chosen message attacks, it follows that A cannot succeed with non-negligible probability.
Exculpability. The adversary A wins the game if he can falsely accuse an honest user of a double-spending. This means that the adversary can interact with honest users to obtain spending from them and he wins if he can produce one spend (S , T , Π ) related to a valid one (S , T , Π ) and such that the output of Identify((S, T, Π), (S , T , Π )) is a public key pk U of a honest user (with non negligible probability).
The security proof of the exculpability involves forking lemma-like technique for an attacker that exploits both valid spending played by honest users and valid withdrawals played by honest users when the extractability of the RO proofs-of-knowledge relies on the DL assumption in order to falsely accuse an honest user. If the Camenisch-Lysysanskaya scheme of the withdrawal protocol uses a group of unknown order, then the exculpability relies on both the DL assumption for an attacker that exploits valid spendings played by honest users in order to falsely accuse an honest user, and on the factorization assumption to ensure the non-malleability and the soundness of the proof of knowledge Φ (see [3] ).
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the first off-line divisible e-cash scheme that provides strong unlinkability and truly anonymity. We introduced the idea of using a security tag in a divisible e-cash scheme. The anonymity of users is achieved without impacting the performance of the spending protocol and without using a trusted third party. The spending protocol exploits the binary structure underlying the divisible coin in order to get an efficient spending protocol. However, even if the new scheme permits the spending of multiple coins at a time, it uses double-exponentiation proofs for the spending phase which is still a little expensive. Thus, for a small number of coins at a time, the spending is still expensive. Another possible improvement for the scheme could be to find a method to detect double spending without computing 2 L serial numbers for a divisible coin of monetary value 2 L .
